








Assessment of potential mare stocking 
impacts on resource access rights and 
livelihoods in Komio Village, Niger River Delta, 
Mali  
 
CBFC Working Paper No. 2 
 
Aaron J.M. Russell
1 and Seydou Coulibaly
2  
 
1 The WorldFish Center, PO Box 500 GPO, 10670 Penang, Malaysia 













                 
 
 
CBFC Working Paper Series 
 
 
The Community-based Fish Culture in Seasonal Floodplains and Irrigation Systems 
(CBFC) project is a five year research project supported by the Challenge Program on 
Water  and  Food  (CPWF),  with  the  aim  of  increasing  productivity  of  seasonally 
occurring water bodies through aquaculture. The project has been implemented in 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Mali and Vietnam, where technical and institutional 
options for community based aquaculture have been tested. The project began in 2005 
and was completed in March 2010.  
 
This  working  paper  represents  work-in-progress.  It  forms  part  of  a  series  of 
documents presenting research findings from the project. The reader is advised that it 






























* Corresponding Author: 
Email. Russell.ajm@gmail.com  
  - 1 - 
Table of Contents 
Executive summary .......................................................................................................... 2 
List of Acronyms and non-English words used .................................................................. 3 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. 4 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... 4 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... 4 
Project Context and Primary Research Questions .............................................................. 5 
Research Setting and Methods .......................................................................................... 7 
Research observations ...................................................................................................... 9 
Institutional History  ...................................................................................................... 9 
Early institutional contexts ........................................................................................ 9 
Establishment of Komio village and the Korondaga Fishing Territory ...................... 10 
Colonial and post-colonial institutional changes ....................................................... 13 
Access Rights to Aquatic Resources in Komio ............................................................. 15 
Mare fishery ........................................................................................................... 15 
Floodplain channel fishery ...................................................................................... 16 
Niger River Fishery ................................................................................................. 18 
Irrigation Scheme Impacts .......................................................................................... 22 
Phase I PIV. ........................................................................................................... 22 
Phase II PIV – at Komio ........................................................................................ 23 
Phase II PIV – at Kamaka. ...................................................................................... 25 
Phase II PIV – at Kouana ....................................................................................... 25 
Livelihood impacts of PIVs ................................................................................... 26 
PIV impacts on labor migration patterns  .................................................................. 29 
Impact assessment of stocking mares on livelihoods and resource access in Komio ............ 31 
Mare stocking recommendations...................................................................................... 34 
Appendix A. Map of Komio Village Territory and Korondaga fishing territory ................. 41 
Appendix B. List of Semi-structured Interviews ............................................................... 42 
  
  - 2 - 
Executive summary 
In the context of the CP-35 project, this visit follows up on a preliminary 
assessment of livelihoods and institutions in Komio village conducted by 
consultants Joffre and Lajaunie.  The objective of the visit was to determine 
how stocking mares around Komio village may impact livelihoods and access 
rights to aquatic resources.  Additional insights were gained from the 
governance experiences and livelihood impacts of village irrigation schemes 
(PIVs).  
An analysis of the village’s institutional history reveals that power is centered 
on a few key leaders, in particular the heads of households descendent from the 
first Marka settlers. The previous chief abused his position by embezzling the 
proceeds from the first collective PIV farming scheme. This had disastrous 
livelihood implications as communities were unable to replace the PIV 
irrigation pump when it broke and many people were forced to migrate in 
search of work.  This event led other communities within Komio’s territory to 
establish their own PIVs, and forced the abdication of Komio’s chief.    
All communities currently appear to embrace greater levels of transparency and 
accountability in their management of the PIVs. PIVs now form the single-
most important livelihood activity for farmers and fishers alike as they ensure 
that households are able to harvest at least one single crop of rice per year, 
irrespective of the vagaries of the Niger River’s flood regime. They also provide 
financially remunerative work opportunities within the village during the dry 
season, resulting in a reversal of outward migration.  
Mares are owned by the Marka families who own the land, but they do not limit 
access or tax these fisheries in any way. According to stakeholder interviews, 
the Bozo fisherfolk appear  most dependent on floodplain and mare fisheries 
for their livelihoods. Unfortunately erosion of the channels connecting mares to 
the Niger River has resulted in declining productivity over time, but they still 
provide important dry season sources of protein and income to residents of 
Komio and neighboring villages.  
Stocking of mares may benefit local residents by contributing to the impacts that 
the PIVs have of providing food and income during the dry season. However, 
this depends on how benefits are distributed. Poorer populations face particular 
risks if land owners impose access fees on non-residents who had previously 
enjoyed free access, as other villages may reciprocate by limiting local villagers' 
access to fish. These risks suggest the need for extensive engagement with the 
community to design equitable governance institutions that will help prevent a 
capture of benefits by the elite of the community.  
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List of Acronyms and non-English words used 
batigi   a fishing territory 
Baba Aougal  Bozo water master in charge of organized closed seasons 
and collective fishing in the mares 
CP   Challenge Programme (specifically, for Food and Water) 
CFA  Communauté Financiaire Africaine (West African currency) 
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Diina  codified system of laws established by the Fulani Cheikh 
Amadou’s empire (1818-1864) 
epervier   cast net  
fouta toro  local name for the Fulani Tukalor Empire, in reference to 
their capital city 
IER   Institut d’Economie Rurale  
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Project Context and Primary Research Questions 
This visit to the village of Komio, in Mali’s Inner Niger River Delta falls under 
the scope of the CP-35 project, and is a follow-up on the initial stakeholder 
assessment carried out by consultant Olivier Joffre in July 2008.   
The purpose of this visit was to build on the CP-35 team’s understanding of 
the likely impacts of stocking mares in Komio on livelihood strategies and 
resource access rights.  Based on the preliminary assessment, a second research 
site, Severi has been abandoned. This was due to fractious intra-community 
rivalries and poor community sensitization to the project, which raised 
concerns regarding how an aquaculture intervention in the mares might impact 
equity in mare resource access rights.  In contrast, Komio appeared to have a 
largely unified leadership that showed interest in collaboration with the project.   
Two main research objectives were pursued: 
1)  To verify the nature of access rights regimes to aquatic resources within 
Komio territory. Additionally, as the mares were thought to be important 
resources for all communities within Komio’s territory, it was necessary 
to visit these other villages and settlements to understand their access 
rights to mare aquatic resources.  
2)  Understand how local irrigation schemes known as Périmètres Irrigués 
Villageois (PIVs) have succeeded or failed in achieving equitable 
livelihood benefits.  From the preliminary assessment, we noted PIVs as 
potentially pivotal contributors to establishing sustainable livelihoods in 
this region due to the income and food that they provide these 
communities during the dry and rainy seasons. Stocking of mares has the 
potential to change resource access rights and livelihood opportunities in 
a similar manner.  Consequently, the team felt that understanding PIV  
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impacts on livelihoods and access rights would be useful for modeling 
the potential impacts of mare stocking.  
This assessment of aquatic resource access rights and the impacts of PIVs 
should provide for a better understanding of the roles played by different 
institutions in Komio, thereby supporting CP-35 team partners in planning 
successful mare stocking trials.   
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Research Setting and Methods 
The research team was composed of Aaron Russell (WorldFish) and Seydou 
Coulibaly (IER), accompanied by a boat conductor and his assistant.  Research 
activities were based out of Komio village, where the team resided within the 
village chief’s compound. As access to mares and irrigated land has livelihood 
implications for all communities within Komio’s territory (see Appendix A), we 
visited all settlements that were accessible: Komio, Kamaka, Kouana and 
Ninya-daga (a fishing camp), but not Kanguila.   
In order to free interviewees from public pressure to portray any specific image 
of their community, interviews were held in individuals’ homes rather than a 
public forum. While the intention was to conduct interviews individually, in all 
but two cases community members were uncomfortable being interviewed 
alone and requested that at least one other community member be present. 
This was most notable in the case of recognized leaders, who expressed a desire 
to avoid raising any suspicions among their followers. The leaders of the 
women’s PIV at Komio also preferred to be interviewed in the presence of the 
chief.   
A list of the stakeholders interviewed is provided in Appendix B. Each 
interview lasted between 1-2 hours. All interviews were conducted in French or 
Bambara, a national language that is understood by most (although less so by 
women, requiring translation by other local women).  In addition to semi-
structured interviews, informal discussions were held with village elders each 
evening which helped to clarify our understanding of certain points.  The 
conclusions presented are based on a triangulation between data from different 
sources interviewed, and incorporates observations made by the first CP-35 
assessment (Joffre and Lajaunie 2008).  
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CP-35 - Komio Visit Itinerary: 
Sept. 20-22 - Flight from Cairo to Bamako, and travel to Mopti by IER vehicle; 
Sept. 23-25 – Work within the region for CP-72; 
Sept. 26 – Travel from Mopti to Komio village by IER pinasse; 
Sept. 27 – Interviews in Komio village; 
Sept. 28 – Interviews in Kamaka village and Ninya-daga fishing camp; 
Sept. 29 – Interviews in Komio and Kouana villages; return to Mopti by IER 
pinasse; 
Sept. 30 – Debriefing and data analysis; 
Oct. 1-2 – Travel to Bamako by IER vehicle, and flight to Cairo.  
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Research observations 
Institutional History 
Early institutional contexts 
The first known users of this landscape were Bozo fisherfolk who migrated and 
fished throughout this region for centuries prior to the establishment by the 
Marka of Komio village; however, their presence was probably a transient one. 
Not withstanding their growing Islamization, the Bozo maintained their 
animistic traditions honoring the water spirits or genies (known as nyenne or 
jegu) that were known to inhabit the waters, and who were regarded as the true 
owners of these waters (Moorehead 1997, Fay 1989). Responsibilities for 
maintenance of this relationship fell to the senior male of the Bozo family 
(known as the “water master”)
1 who established a pact with the genie of a 
specific water body.  
Although specific regulations varied, they generally included the setting of 
fishing seasons, and conducting ceremonial sacrifices to the water spirit 
(COFAD GmbH 2002; Kassibo 2004, Cotula 2007, Moorehead 1997, Kone 
1985, Beeler 2006, Fay 1989).  Fishing seasons were set in accordance with 
seasonal changes in river water levels. During the flood season (when fish are 
dispersed, and territorial limits are hard to define) access to water bodies was 
granted freely to all in exchange for a symbolic token of respect (known as the 
“prix de kola”).  However during low water levels (when fishing territories were 
easily defined and when fish were forced into the main watercourses and 
isolated mares), visiting fishers were expected to pay a third of their catch to the 
                                                 
1 Known as “maitre des eaux” (water master) or “chef des eaux” (water chief).  
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water master (an institution known as “manga jii”) (Moorehead 1987, see also 
Lavigne Delville 2003, Kone 1985, Fay 1989).  
Establishment of Komio village and the Korondaga Fishing Territory 
Traditional institutions and livelihoods underwent significant change following 
the establishment of the Fulani “Fulbe barn” Empire by Cheikh Amadou 
(1818-1864). Specifically, the stability and security encouraged permanent 
settlement of the land by displaced peoples, and the new rulers codified all 
access to natural resources through a system of laws referred to as the Diina 
(Kone 1985, Moorehead 1997, Fay 1989a, Sarch and Allison 2000).  The Marka 
are an ethnic group that traditionally farmed rice, and who are known to have 
maintained good relations and close economic interdependencies with the 
Bozo (Fay 1989).  According to oral accounts, the Marka were the first to 
establish a permanent settlement at Komio, and they purchased the territorial 
rights from the Fulani Tukalor Empire (1864-93)
2 (referred to locally as “fouta 
toro” in reference to their capital city). The territory was subsequently 
subdivided between the families of four Timota descendents: Mamadou (the 
village chief’s family), Manfing, Nafi and Doudou Timota. Following the 
establishment of Komio, the fouta toro granted Bozo
3, Somono, and Malenke 
permission to establish their own villages (Kamaka
4, Kouana, and Kanguila, 
respectively) within the territorial domain of Komio.  
The only limitation to the Marka ownership of land resources related to the 
right of passage for transhumant livestock. These rights were central to the 
livestock rearing livelihoods of the Fulani conquerors. Consequently, the rights 
                                                 
2 The Fulani Tukalor Empire overthrew the Fulbe Barn Empire in 1864. 
3 Note – these were not local Bozo, rather they had migrated from a village called Kamaka 
near Maasina (in Togere Fumbe Territoire), and decided to settle here once the Fulani 
Empire had pacified the area. 
4 This community is located on the margins of Komio and Sense village territories.  
  - 11 - 
of passage for transhumant cattle through the landscape are maintained by a 
Fulani leader, called the jowro. In the case of Komio village, however, as 
discussed by Joffre and Lajaunie (2008), the relatively poor quality of pasture 
land, means that local livelihoods are only impacted by the passage of cattle for 
a short period of time.  This is still the case today. 
Interestingly, while many traditional institutional forms regulating access to 
water bodies remain the same in Komio today, the roles of water master over 
the Niger River’s resources now belong to the first Somono family that settled 
in Komio. The Somono were a caste of river boatmen and fishers who served 
as a naval force for the Fulani Empires, and who established settlements along 
the banks of the Niger River at one day (traveling by boat) intervals 
(Moorehead 1997).
5  In some parts of the delta, the Somono took over the 
temporal Bozo water master roles (including levying manga jii), and left the 
Bozo water masters with a purely spiritual role of maintaining the relations with 
the water spirits (known by a new title, namu-tuu) (Kone 1985, Moorehead 
1997). However, in the case of Komio, it appears that the Somono water 
master (Mr. Mama Kanta) took over both the spiritual and temporal Bozo 
water master roles for the Niger River fisheries
6. The territory that Mama 
Kanta purchased under the Tukalor Empire is known as “Korondaga batigi” and 
covers roughly 25km of the Niger River (see Appendix A). The management of 
this fishing territory is discussed further below. 
The single existing Bozo institution today is that of water priest (known as 
“Baba Aougal”), who is responsible for scheduling (in concert with the village 
                                                 
5 This is a caste that was created during the Mali empire (1250-1450), initially primarily made 
up of Bozo fisherfolk, but later included ethnic Bobo, Bambara, and Dogon captives and 
developed into a navy (Moorehead 1997).  
6 However, according to local leaders today, the fishing territories in this area were first 
established by the Somono water masters themselves.  
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council) of the fishing seasons in the larger floodplain mares. Local leaders claim 
that they invited the senior Bozo lineage to take up this role due to its extensive 
animistic knowledge which was believed to protect people from crocodiles, 
hippopotami, and drowning. While this role appears quite similar to that 
described above as namu-tuu, from this brief visit it was difficult to determine 
whether this title was a remnant of a past role when Bozo’s were the water 
masters or whether they were actually invited to play this ceremonial role. As 
mentioned by Joffre and Lajaunie (2008), informants confirm the ongoing 
animistic ceremonial role played by the Baba Aougal (Mr. Isaaca Traore), 
however as the individual is a member of the Muslim clergy, he is reluctant to 
talk about the animistic traditions involved in his role as water priest (a local 
mosque is shown in Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Traditional mud brick mosque in Kamaka village 
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Colonial and post-colonial institutional changes 
Neither the period of colonialism (1899-1960), nor post-colonial 
socialism (1960-68) and military dictatorship (1968-91) appear to have 
introduced significant changes to village boundaries; however the role of the 
chieftaincy was significantly undermined by all.  With a highly centralized 
bureaucracy, chiefs were relegated to seeking influence through their support of 
a highly authoritarian government, and the military dictatorship’s governance 
was described by Kassibo (2004) as, 
“…characterized by the absence of freedom, excessive central administration, 
centralized control over natural resource management, a paternalistic, 
directorial approach to development, monopolization of all political life through 
the PUC
7, and the centralized control over the economy.”   
With the introduction of multi-party democracy in Mali (in 1991), the 
government embraced the international development drive for decentralized 
governance. As part of this process, the population of each village was 
permitted to choose its commune, and all the villages within Komio’s village’s 
territory chose to join different communes from that of Komio itself.
8  These 
choices may have been partly due to grievances over poor leadership by 
Komio’s former chief which caused the collapse of a local irrigation scheme, 
prompting a large-scale exodus of villagers to the cities (discussed below). 
By aligning themselves with different communes, several villages have also 
been able to seek NGO-funding for development activities independent from 
those of Komio itself (such as the second phase of PIV projects discussed 
below).  However, it should be noted, that rather than replacing pre-existing 
                                                 
7 “Parti Unique Constitutionnel”, the single constitutional party belonging to President 
General Moussa Traore’s military dictatorship that lasted from 1968 to1991 
8 Kanguila and Kamaka chose Kounari commune, Kouana chose Konna commune, and Komio chose 
Borondougou commune. All fall within Mopti cercle. (http://www.dgemali.net/bureauvote/mopti.html).   
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traditional or national centralized institutions, the communes and the 
strengthened regional governments have simply become another layer of 
institution to be used by particular actors in pursuit of their own goals. Indeed, 
Komio’s village territory remains intact, and all the land that was not previously 
given for the use of residents in Komio, Kamaga, Kouana and Kanguila 
remains the property of the four Timota clan heads.  Additionally, all communes 
continue to pay deference to (and may continue to delegate some 
responsibilities entirely to) Komio’s chieftaincy when conducting development 
activities within the village territory.  
The development of NGO-sponsored irrigated farming associations has, 
however, facilitated the emergence of new leadership capacity in each village.  
Such developments have been described elsewhere in Mali, as potentially 
contributing to and enabling a broader range of community leaders, providing 
alternative avenues for poorer community members to gain access to resources 
(Beauchemin and Schoumaker 2006, Nijenhuis 2003, Lippman and Lewis 1988, 
Blair 2000). This has certainly been the case with respect to women’s PIV 
associations in Komio and Kamaka, and the men’s PIV associations in Kamaka 
and Kouana.   
In the village of Komio, having learned from his predecessor, the 
current chief (Mr. Mamadou Timota) appears to put great stake on 
transparency in his dealings with outside organizations, and relies heavily on the 
advice and support of other senior family representatives. However, his main 
advisor is Mr. Manfing Timota, head of the largest land-owning family, the 
chairperson of the men’s PIV association, and the village representative to the 
commune assembly.  While their combined leadership appears well-intentioned 
and equitable, the accumulation of influential roles by this senior advisor 
facilitated by the decentralization process and the introduction of NGO-funded  
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activities cannot but be regarded as having reinforced pre-existing power-
structures in this village.  
 
Access Rights to Aquatic Resources in Komio  
Mare fishery  
The main mares within the territory of Komio are owned by the four Timota 
families on whose land the mares are found.  However, while their ownership is 
common knowledge, access to these mares is open to all members of the 
surrounding communities at no charge, and neither the Timotas nor Baba 
Aougal limit who may participate in mare fishing.  Baba Aougal is responsible for 
setting the closed season (the “mise en défens”) which occurs once the mare 
becomes separated from the river (usually during February-March). He also sets 
the dates for collective fishing in the four main mares, and at times may be 
called upon to organize fishing in the river reserves (see below).  As discussed 
by Joffre and Lajaunie (2008), the closed season collective fishing events for the 
four main mares are interspersed by 1-2 weeks over the course of the dry season 
(April-July), with the deepest mare (known as “Mama Pondu”) being fished in 
May.  Also, unlike some mares in other communities, land owners do not charge 
a fee (manga jii) in exchange for allowing non-residents to participate in 
collective fishing events. The primary fish species captured during the collective 
fishing events include both some that migrate back down to the river (Citharinus 
sp., Siluranodon sp., Auchenoglanis sp., Schilbe, Tilapia and Bagrus bajad) and others 
that remain in the deeper mares throughout the dry season (Clarias, Hydrocynus 
brevis, Lates, Distichodus, Hemichromis fasciatus and Brienomyrus niger)( Bénech et al 
1994).    
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In addition to the large mares, there are at least twelve smaller mares within 
Komio’s territory, and access to these is not regulated in any way. While mare 
fisheries have declined significantly in terms of their ability to provide for local 
livelihoods overall, Bozo women in Komio emphasize their continued 
importance in helping them provide for their children’s needs (much as in the 
case of the PIV discussed below).  Lajaunie and Joffre (2008) cite that between 
40-75% of the total fish caught in mares is caught by Komio’s Bozo fisherfolk 
through their control over the channels connecting mares to the river.  
Due to diminished productivity in Komio’s mares, the neighboring villages 
appear to place limited importance on Komio’s mare fisheries. This is supported 
by the fact that the traditionally floodplain fishing Bozo residents from 
neighboring village of Kamaka, don’t even limit access to fishing channels 
linking their smaller mares. Additionally, migrant Bozo residents of Ninya-daga 
fishing camp indicate their primary mare fishery to be that of the neighboring 
village, Wanyaka.  We were unable to visit the village of Kanguila, but its lack 
of alternative sources of income from irrigation schemes (see discussion below) 
and fish from the river, might suggest a greater dependence on mare fisheries. 
Floodplain channel fishery 
The only private property rights that are enforced for aquatic resources around 
Komio relate to the three main channels that connect the large mares to each 
other and to the Niger River itself.  Mare channels are strategic resources as 
they are owned by the landowners on whose land the channels lie (i.e. one of 
the four branches of the Timota family from the Marka ethnic group). 
However mare channel fishing is primarily practiced by a few Bozo families who 
have held exclusive fishing rights to the channels for several generations, in 
exchange for one third of the catch (an arrangement known as manga jii).  
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Ownership of fishing channels is only exercised during the months of 
November to February, when the declining water levels (a season referred to as 
the “décrue ”) make the channels strategic fishing locations. The enforcement of 
private channel fishing rights is a common institution throughout the Inner 
Niger River Delta, and though it may raise questions regarding equity in 
ownership of channel fishing rights (Fay 1989), it does not appear to be a 
source of conflict in Komio. The primary channel fishing method used by the 
Bozo is based on use fishing traps spanning the entire channel, constructed of 
fine-meshed gillnet spanned over a wooden frame, with multiple entrances that 
allow fish to enter but not exit (see Figure 2). Additionally, gillnets may be 
strung across the channels.  
 
Figure 2. Fishing traps in a mare channel 
  
The productivity of the Inner Niger River Delta fishery is directly related to the 
extent of floodplain inundation, which allows fish to disperse in a nutrient-rich  
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habitat. During the décrue, floodplain waters gradually drain into the mares and 
subsequently into the Niger River and its tributaries. A number of fish species 
are known to follow annual “lateral” migrations between the floodplain and the 
Niger River in search of breeding and/or feeding grounds, particularly the 
genera: Citharinus sp., Siluranodon sp., Auchenoglanis sp., Schilbe sp., Tilapia sp. and 
Bagrus bajad (Bénech et al 1994). 
Prior to colonialism, the communities excavated channels connecting the rivers 
to the village mares.  This had a number of motivations. By facilitating the 
inundation of the floodplains and mares, the communities were able to decrease 
their vulnerability to seasonal changes in river water levels and ensure that 
water levels were sufficient for rice farming. Additionally, this increased the 
amount of fish entering into their local mares providing the community with a 
supply of fish for every-day needs during the dry season, and the channels 
themselves enabled the communities to more easily harvest the fish as they left 
the mares to return to the river.  
The droughts of 1973 and 1978 are particularly noted by villagers as having 
contributed to the siltation of the primary channel that connects the main mares 
together and to the Niger River. Community leaders reminisce about times in 
the past when some families were apparently able to sustain viable livelihoods 
based on mare fisheries, and lament that this is no longer the case.  They are 
currently looking for external support to re-excavate this channel. 
Niger River Fishery   
Throughout the Inner Niger River Delta, ownership of the main river courses 
falls to the Somono, who claim special relationships with their local river 
deities.  As discussed above, the Somono fisherfolk purchased ownership rights 
to this portion of the river; however they claim that the water masters’  
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relationships with the local water deity predate this legal arrangement. Komio 
lies toward the upstream end of “Korondaga” fishing territory (known as a 
“batigi”) that stretches from Kouana to Koubi
9, a distance of roughly 25 km 
(see Appendix A).   
This batigi was originally granted to a single Somono water master (Mr. Ali 
Mama Kanta), but when his descendents settled in three different communities 
(Kouana, Komio and Sensé) they subdivided the ceremonial tasks involved in 
river management between the three families. According to one story, at a time 
when there were conflicts between the different fishing communities, the 
communities wanted to subdivide the batigi between the three communities. 
However, the forefather who made the original pact with the water spirits had 
warned them that they risked losing rights to the river altogether if they tried to 
do so.  Today, during much of the year, fishers from communities within the 
Korondaga batigi
10 are allowed to fish without charge, but migrant fishers (see 
Figure 3) must request permission and pay the water masters the symbolic prix 
de kola (between 2500-5000 CFA.
11   
                                                 
9 The stretch of the Niger River between Mopti and Lac Debo is subdivided into territories 
(batigi) as follows: Namara to Nèmèdè (“Tonkorongon batigi”); Nèmèdè to Kouana 
(“Wagnaka batigi”), Kouana to Koubi (“Korondaga batigi”), Koubi to Kouansa (“Kona 
batigi”), Kouansa to Gouraou (territory name unknown). Then Lac Debo is divided between: 
Gouraou batigi along the eastern shore, Tioka batigi along the western shore. 
10 Specifically, the villages: Kouana, Saya, Komio, Kamaka, Nukura, Sense, Sense Ladji, 
Batamani, Kwataka, Kubi 
11 However, some long-term Bozo residents of Ninya-daga report not needing to pay this fee 
or request permission to fish due to their prolonged residency.  
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Figure 3. Bozo fisher in the Niger River 
 
However during the dry season, the Niger River dries up in many areas, leaving 
behind isolated pools in what were the deepest portions of the river.  At the 
end of the décrue (the decline of water levels), four of these pools
12, referred to 
as “fishing reserves” are closed to all fishing by the Somono water masters in 
Kouana, Komio and Sensé.  This period referred to as a “mise en défens” 
(closure) lasts two to three months, usually between February-April, to allow 
the remaining fish to grow.  Subsequently, the water masters organize collective 
fishing events (known as a “yaya”) in the fishing reserves.   
While the fishing reserves are guarded by the children belonging to all three 
water masters, the remaining tasks associated with the yaya are divided between 
the different families. At the end of this period, the water master in Kouana 
calls a meeting of the water masters in Kouana (plus the water master from 
                                                 
12 These pools are individually named: Jimu, Somi dobo, Tanako, and Dambo. The fourth 
reserve (Dambo) has declined in importance due to river siltation.  
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Wagnakara
13) to discuss the upcoming fishing activities and Kouana’s water 
master announces the dates for the collective fishing events. At this point 
invitations are sent to all surrounding villages, and even to as far away as Mopti.  
At this point, the water master from Komio sacrifices a black goat to the water 
genie.  Then on the first day of each yaya, the water master from Sensé recites 
an incantation and enters the water first with his community members, 
followed by the other communities. In each of the reserves, the yaya may last 
for up to 15 days. 
Local fishing community members may participate freely in these collective 
fishing events, but non-resident fishers are required to pay manga jii. These 
fishers traditionally used gillnet and beach seines and were expected to give 
1/3
rd of their catch to the water master
14. However, due to the rising cost of 
living, Somono water masters recently raised the manga jii to ½ of the catch.  
The manga jii is paid to the Somono water masters and funds are shared 
between: 
￿  Individual payments to all Somono families, 
￿  A collective treasury that helps Somono families pay for emergency 
needs, 
￿  Purchase of the sacrificial goat and other expenses associated with the 
ceremony. 
                                                 
13 Apparently past water masters had noted that people from Wagnakara and Korondaga 
fishing territories were free from danger in each others’ territories, and came to the 
conclusion that the same genie owned both areas. Since then the Wagnakara water master 
has met annually with the Korondaga territory water masters to discuss fishing events, 
however the Wagnakara water master is responsible for organizing his own ceremonies. 
14 Except for cast nets (known as epervier), which require a payment between CFA 2500-5000.  
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At the end of the collective fishing events, if the water levels are low enough, 
the Bozo water priest, Baba Aougal may organize a follow-up yaya event in the 
river reserves for the use of two-handed dip nets that are typically used in mares. 
Irrigation Scheme Impacts 
Phase I PIV.   
According to community members, the Sahelian drought of 1973 was 
devastating to the population of Komio, forcing most to sell off their 
productive capital, and resulting in large scale migrations by villagers to cities. 
The government established the first rural irrigation scheme in Komio (known 
as “Périmètres Irrigués Villageois” or PIV) in 1986 on land owned by the village 
chief of Komio.  All families of Komio, Kouana, Kanguila and Kamaka villages 
were allocated a plot of land within the PIV. This irrigation scheme was 
initiated by the prefect of the cercle
15 with support from the Office du Riz – Mopti 
(ORM) and was excavated using forced community labor as residents were 
poorly sensitized regarding the benefits that they would gain from the PIV.
16  
Community perceptions of the PIV changed rapidly as they were able to 
harvest two crops of rice each year rather than the unreliable single harvest that 
depended on sufficient flooding of the delta (see Figure 4). The high and 
assured productivity of PIV- versus floodplain-riziculture encouraged many 
                                                 
15 Based on the territorial delineations and administrative system established by the French 
colonial system, the military dictatorship governed the country through their appointed 
governors (at the region), prefects (at the cercle), and sous-prefects (at the arrondissement). Since 
1991, the government abolished the arrondissement, and instead established a more 
decentralized level of government, known as the commune.  
16 This took place during the Traore dictatorship, and numerous respondents describe harsh 
treatment at the hands of the government services for those who resisted contributing their 
labor.    
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families to return to their villages.
17 However the chief of Komio and local 
politicians in charge of the PIV misappropriated the proceeds, causing the 
neighboring communities to seek establishment of their own PIVs in the early 
1990’s.  For this same reason production in Komio came to an end in 1997 
when the pumps broke and were unable to be replaced. 
 
Figure 4. PIV in Komio Village 
Phase II PIV – at Komio 
When the previous chief was unable to repay the embezzled PIV funds, the 
community removed him from his position as chief, and in 1996 they asked his 
brother, living in Bamako, to take up the chieftaincy.  However, between 1997 
and 2002 Komio residents were unable to cultivate their PIV as they lacked a 
                                                 
17 Joffre and Lajaunie (2008) report productivity of inundated rice cultivation in the Komio’s 
floodplain to be anywhere between 500-1000kg of rice per hectare depending on the access 
in each family to labor and the productive capital needed (plows, oxen).  In contrast, PIV 
culture is reported by this community to achieve between 7700-9600 kg/ha for each harvest 
due to the intensified rice farming practices used, the collective application of fertilizer, and 
the guaranteed access to water.   
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pump to irrigate the area, resulting in another exodus from the village to towns 
and cities.  In 2002, the new chief was able to convince ORM to supply them 
with two more pumps, and ORM again replaced one of these pumps in April 
2008, allowing this PIV to produce two rice crops per year.  The new PIV 
leadership also received training on management of resources and introduced 
an annual membership fee which goes toward pump maintenance, and the 
purchase of fuel and fertilizer. A PIV committee of 11 people was selected by 
the village chief and his advisors and approved for a 3-yr mandate by the 
community. The President of the Phase II PIV committee is the chief’s senior 
advisor, Mr. Manfing Timota. 
In this region of Mali, women do not traditionally practice rice farming; 
however a group of roughly 120 women had organized themselves into an 
association for the collective cultivation of onions. In 2000, a visitor to the 
community recommended that they attempt rice farming, and they were able to 
get the NGO, “Organisation pour la Gestion de l'Environnement au Sahel” 
(OGS) to donate a pump in 2001. This pump broke in 2002, and another pump 
that was donated by another project in 2002 broke in 2003.  In 2006, the 
women had one of the pumps repaired and it worked for a year. Now they use 
one of the repaired pumps belonging to the men’s PIV scheme. Each of the 
women has a small plot, roughly 0.10 ha in size, enabling them to produce 
between 2-4 bags of rice per year.  Having seen the livelihood impacts of this 
scheme, other women would like to join, however the limited capacity of the 
pump limits membership to the original group. This Association organizes a 
loan scheme to which all members contribute CFA 100 each week, and from 
which members can borrow for up to three months with a charge of CFA 250. 
Additionally, an annual fee of CFA 7500 goes toward maintenance and fuel for 
the pump.  
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Phase II PIV – at Kamaka.  
Kamaka village established its own PIV in 1994 with the assistance of a 
European Union (EU) funded work-for-food program that paid community 
members for their labor, and provided them with a water pump.  This pump 
has the capacity to irrigate 20 ha of land, however this community is able to 
supply 86 PIV members with .25 ha plots of land (for a total of 21.5 ha.).  In 
this community, membership was allocated to all physically capable men (rather 
than on a family basis) including three longer-term Bozo fisher migrants from 
Ninya-daga fishing camp. 
The women of Kamaka were also able to gain the support of OGS for the 
construction of their own PIV in 1997, in which 41 women share 5 ha of land 
(0.12 ha each). A third PIV of 24 ha was established in 2005 by the 
governmental “Programme National d'Infrastructure Rurale” (PNIR), however 
the pump for this PIV broke, and they now share a single pump with the 
women’s PIV, providing them a single growing season each. 
 
Phase II PIV – at Kouana 
Similarly, Kouana established its own PIV in 1996 through an OGS/European 
Union funded program, which provided them with two pumps and fertilizer. 
These pumps broke in 1998, and the community was given another pump in 
2005 by the EU-funded “Projet Valorization des Ressources en Eaux de Surface en 5me 
Region” (see Figure 5). During the period when this community didn’t have a 
pump, high levels of flooding in the natural floodplain enabled a majority of 
community members to cultivate rice crops that way, and remain in the village.  
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This village’s PIV scheme is limited to one season per year as the arm of the 
Niger River on which it is located dries up completely during the dry season.  
 
Figure 5. PIV Irrigation pump at Kouana 
Livelihood impacts of PIVs 
In all communities visited, participation in PIVs appears to be open to all who 
are willing to contribute their labor at its inception, without regard for ethnicity 
or residency (migratory Bozo fishers are known to participate in both Kamaka 
and Komio).  All participants speak positively of the livelihood impacts. The 
famine of 1973 eroded most households productive capital asset base (ploughs, 
draft animals, fishing nets, canoes, etc.), forcing some families to quit farming 
or fishing altogether.  The establishment of the PIVs has enabled most families 
to regain this capital, which positively impacts their productivity in the PIVs as 
well as farming in the floodplain, and has resulted in a visible accumulation of 
livestock in the community.  Indeed, the only conflicts mentioned regarding the  
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PIVs relates to growing numbers of livestock that attempt to feed in the rice 
paddies.   
Overall, while Somono and Bozo residents still regard themselves firstly as 
fisherfolk, many acknowledge that PIV rice farming has become the single-
most valuable source of capital among farmers and fishers alike (particularly for 
those in Komio where they harvest two PIV crops per year). The key PIV 
statistics are presented in Table 1. According to community respondents, the 
wholesale price of rice sold in this community ranged between CFA 7,500-
14,000 per 80 kg bag, which is roughly half the retail price documented by 
USAID (2008)
18 at the market in Segou.  With production levels for most male 
heads of households in Komio, Kamaka, and Kouana at around 2400 kg 
(though it should be noted that one PIV in Kamaka reports achieving double 
this level of production), the local wholesale value of rice produced by men 
ranges between CFA 225-420,000 (or US$ 511-955)
19.  
Table 1 Komio Village Territory PIV scheme statistics 
 
Village  Gender 
Total area 








Komio  Men  40  300  0.13  2  2496 
  Women  5  120  0.04  1  384 
Kamaka  Men 1  21.5  86  0.25  2  4800 
  Men 2  24  ?  0.25  1  2400 
  Women  5  41  0.12  1  1152 
Kouana  Men  12  48  0.25  1  2400 
Notes:             
1 Stakeholders estimate production per ha per crop at 120 bags (each 80 kg), or 9600 kg. 
 
According to a recent World Bank study, Malian households on average 
consumed CFA 153,000 worth of rice this last year (Nouve and Wodon 2008), 
implying that most households in this territory produced roughly double their 
                                                 
18 The value of rice grown based on market prices in 2008 is CFA 16,000-27,000 per 80 kg bag (USAID 
2008). 
19 Calculated based on an exchange rate of US$ 1=CFA 440.   
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household consumptive needs. This conclusion is supported by respondents 
who highlight the increasing importance of their village as a source for rice for 
the surrounding villages that do not have their own PIVs. A number of 
community members also cite their guaranteed income from PIVs as 
facilitating access to credit from banks in Mopti. One caveat of PIV 
membership, however, is the requirement that all plots be farmed each year, as 
they cannot be sold and will be redistributed to other families if unused. 
Though their plot sizes are smaller, and they only are able to produce a single 
crop per year, the impact of the women’s PIVs has also been substantial. Given 
that, women do not traditionally cultivate rice, and the marginal profitability of 
onion production (which was their main activity before establishment of the 
PIV) in this region, women’s financial dependence on male family members 
had been high.  Since creating their own PIVs, women have become better able 
to provide for their needs and the needs of their children.
20 (see Figure 6). 
                                                 
20 At Komio and Kamaka, women’s PIV should have achieved production rates of 384 kg (valued at CFA 
36-67,000 or US$ 80-153), and 1152 kg (valued at CFA 108-202,000 or US$ 245-258), respectively.  
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Figure 6. Women collectively transplanting rice in their PIV 
 
PIV impacts on labor migration patterns 
In all communities, one of the principal impacts of the PIVs, as described by 
respondents, has been to reverse or stem the flow of migrants to the cities as 
the earnings from the PIVs outweigh activities that they would pursue in cities.  
This does not mean that migration to cities has ended, however, as the 
“wealthier” households continue to send family members to the cities, thereby 
enabling them to earn additional income and find sources for cheaper farming 
inputs. Similarly, as found by Wampfler (2006) and Joffre and Lajaunie (2008), 
it is primarily those Somono and Bozo fisherfolk who have more productive 
capital who can send family members on seasonal fishing migrations to Lac 
Debo in the dry season.  In some cases, these fishers return to their villages in 
time for PIV activities, or they pay others to farm their plot for them while they 
focus on their fishing activities.  Joffre and Lajaunie (2008) found that wealthier  
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farming households also may simply pay others to farm for them and invest 
their own labor elsewhere.  
This reflects the dichotomy of scenarios presented by many studies on 
migration in western Africa.  During periods of economic or climatic stress, the 
inability of rural areas and secondary towns to support livelihoods forces rural 
populations to send their most productive labor resources away as migrant 
labor as a last resort (Beauchemin and Schoumaker 2006). However, in many 
cases, poor households are typically less able to invest in seasonal migration 
due to a lack of social networks and surplus male labor in their households 
(Azam and Gubert 2006, Hampshire 2006, Harts-Broekhuis 1997). Rather, it is 
primarily the wealthier households who choose to send some family members 
to the cities as a strategic investment based upon the relative costs and benefits 
that these young men represent outside their villages compared with that in the 
village (Azam and Gubert 2006, de Bruijn and van Dijk 2003, de Haan et al 
2002, Gubert 2002, Hampshire 2006, Harts-Broekhuis 1997).    
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Impact assessment of stocking mares on livelihoods and resource access 
in Komio  
Following painful lessons learned through leadership corruption in the past, it 
appears that local institutions in Komio currently maintain high levels of equity 
both between the different stakeholder groups in Komio.  The establishment 
of multiple PIVs in three communities has also contributed to the development 
of leadership capacities and livelihood alternatives in neighboring communities. 
This is particularly encouraging in respect to the women’s PIVs.   
Although the leadership of Komio appears to be transparent and accountable 
to its people, the accumulation of influential roles by the chief’s principal 
advisor, Mr. Manfing Timota, does raise some questions regarding the potential 
for elite capture of future project benefits.  This is of particular concern as he is 
also head of the family that owns the specific mare (“Mama Pondu”) under 
consideration for stocking. Any intervention in this community should first 
engaging with a diverse array of stakeholder groups to ensure that the project 
isn’t misled by a partial contextual understanding provided by the community 
leadership.   
Although there are some questions as to the true history of water master roles 
in the Korondaga batigi and the mares of Komio Village, this does not appear to 
be a point of contestation within the community.  Institutions regulating 
aquatic resources in the Niger River are clearly designed to provide income to 
the Somono community, but access to these aquatic resources appears to be 
open to all local stakeholders without discrimination based on ethnicity, gender, 
or residency. Although the recent increase in taxation (manga jii) of outsider 
fishers by Somono water masters does not impact community members  
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directly, this might impact poorer fisher livelihoods if the water masters of the 
nearby Wagnakara batigi (and other batigi) raise their manga jii correspondingly. 
Mares are recognized as belonging to individual branches of the Timota clan; 
however these families do not impose any fees for participation in collective 
fishing events. The productivity of the mares has declined due to siltation of the 
channel connecting them to the Niger River, but they remain valuable sources 
of supplementary food and income during the dry season for Komio village. Of 
particular note is the value of the mares for poorer household subsistence needs, 
and Bozo women’s abilities to feed and clothe their households. On the other 
hand, fishing rights in the channels draining floodplain mares are managed as 
private property during the season of declining water levels (décrue ).  
While the initial PIV at Komio was established with little capacity-building for 
stakeholders or sensitization as to its benefits, all residents from all villages (and 
even some migrant fishers) appear to benefit from the PIVs today without any 
discrimination due to ethnicity or residency. The only exception is for Kanguila 
village which is situated too far from the river to have a PIV. Rice farming was 
not historically an activity practiced by women in this area, but in two of the 
villages (Komio and Kamaka), women have been supported by NGOs and the 
men’s PIVs in the establishment of their own PIVs.  The PIVs appear to have 
revolutionized local communities in two major ways: 
￿  They guarantee that residents have a rice crop each year (irrespective of 
flood conditions), reversing the emigration of villagers to cities; and  
￿  Those PIVs that are able to operate during the dry season provide young 
men with profitable livelihood opportunities when they would otherwise 
migrate seasonally in search of work.  
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The PIV livelihood impacts are apparent as many families have been able to 
recover productive capital that had been lost following the droughts of 1973 
and 1978, and a number of households have invested in livestock.  In some 
cases, those households that send youths to work in cities, now do so in order 
to reap additional benefits rather than out of desperation. Again, women’s PIVs 
are a significant boon providing them with financial independence.  
In terms of overall livelihood impacts, unless mare productivity is increased 
through the excavation of channels, even stocked mares will probably not rival 
the importance of PIVs to the community as a whole. However, they would 
increase local communities’ access to protein and income during the dry 
season, a period when few other economic activities takes place other than 
farming in the PIV. With careful citing of enclosures (in order to avoid mare 
margins that are of value for livestock forage), stocking of mares during this 
period does not appear to pose significant risks of conflicts with other land- or 
aquatic-resource user groups.  However, while mare owners do not currently 
charge a manga jii for participation in collective fishing events, any increase in 
value of these mare fisheries (as anticipated by stocking) may tempt mare owners 
to start charging for the right to participate (as is done to outsiders in the river 
fishing reserves and in mares elsewhere).  Any manga jii levied on fishing in the 
mare could limit livelihood abilities of poorer households (as described in Joffre 
and Lajaunie 2008) to sustain themselves. As mentioned in regards to the 
increased manga jii now being charged for outsiders’ participation in river 
reserve fishing, any new taxation of outsiders fishing in Mama mare may 
negatively impact poorer residents by possibly encouraging other communities 
to charge them for access to their mares.  
Governance issues in relation to PIVs appear to have been most challenging 
when communities shared the use of a resource that was central to livelihoods,  
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and when these institutions lacked in transparency and accountability (as was 
the case with the first Komio PIV). While Komio’s leadership appear to be well 
aware of these issues, the potential for abuse by a highly centralized core of 
power brokers in Komio should be taken into consideration in planning any 
intervention (with specific regard to Mr. Manfing Timota).  
A final concern should be raised regarding the sustainability of any mare 
stocking activity and institutions. Based on these communities’ experiences 
with PIVs, they do not yet appear able to sustain activities on their own and 
although they collect fees for the maintenance of pumps, they have repeatedly 
been forced to request additional donations of pumps from NGOs and the 
government. 
As it was not possible for the team to visit Kanguila village, we were unable to 
evaluate whether this community’s lack of PIV, and/or declining productivity 
of mare fisheries has resulted in particular livelihood hardships. However, it is 
likely that (absent other livelihood opportunities not identified) livelihoods in 
this community are more vulnerable to the vagaries of river flooding and 
rainfall levels/seasonality. The mares may therefore be of particular value to 
those who remain in this community during the dry season. Any future plans to 
increase productivity of, and/or alter institutional arrangements in regards to 
access to mares may have a significant impact on this community, a factor which 
should be taken into account. 
 
Mare stocking recommendations 
According to Komio’s leadership, IER has not yet detailed any specifics 
regarding how they plan to stock the Mama mare.  Consequently expectations 
have not yet been raised and the recommendations from this analysis (and that  
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of Joffre and Lajaunie (2008)) may be integrated without endangering our 
working relationship with this community:  
Forums for public input: As the mare is located in Komio village, project 
planning will necessarily be led by the existing leadership of Komio. However 
prior community sensitization activities need to ensure that the full range of 
stakeholders in Komio are given the opportunity to voice concerns regarding 
how mare stocking will impact livelihoods and access to resources.  We should 
also provide similar public forums to the members of Kamaka, Kouana, and 
Kanguila village, and possibly encourage their representation on any 
governance committee established.  
Access to mares and distribution of benefits: From the discussions led by Joffre 
and Lajaunie (2008), a number of options were considered by the community:   
￿  Distribution of the harvest between households; 
￿  Marketing of the harvest to collect funds for the village and to provide a 
savings fund for use towards village needs; 
￿  50% of the harvest should be divided between households and 50% 
should be sold to go towards the village saving fund;  
￿  Sell the harvest to finance the digging of the channel between the mares 
and the river. 
In subsequent discussions with the community, in order to decide how benefits 
should be distributed, we might want to encourage discussion around which 
subgroups within this community and in neighboring communities: a) have the 
greatest dependence on mare resources throughout the year, and b) are the least 
able to provide for themselves from existing livelihood activities.  As listed 
above, there is a danger that income raised will go to (mostly male) heads of  
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households, and will be limited to the village of Komio itself.  Some 
consideration might therefore be given to the following sub-groups: 
￿  Younger households who do not have access to PIV plots (estimated by 
Joffre and Lajaunie (2008) at 7%);  
￿  Komio’s women, who currently only have small PIV plots; 
￿  Bozo who may rely more on mare fishing as a livelihood activity than do 
others;  
￿  Younger people, who are currently largely dependent on the heads of 
households for income; 
￿  Community members of Kanguila, if their reliance on mare fisheries is 
assessed to be proportionately greater due to absence of alternatives. 
Regarding village funds, the setting of village priorities needs to be done in a 
transparent manner and must actively seek to engage with more than just 
village leaders or heads of households.  In addition to projects that increase 
incomes, given the poor literacy levels and high disease burdens faced by many 
Niger River communities, this village may want to consider objectives beyond 
strictly economic ones, such as improving access to education and health. 
Based on the community’s estimation of how much it would cost to have a 
new channel dug to connect the mares (CFA 100 million), this seems like a 
doubtful investment of mare fish culture proceeds.  
Potential conflicts with other fishing activities:  As fish pens may act as fish 
aggregation devices for natural fish stocks, Bozo fishing activities may come 
into conflict with the management of stocked fish pens. Additionally, the 
limited water flow into mares following the decline of river flood level will limit 
both the density and quantity of fish that can be stocked, and will impact the  
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productivity of existing fish stocks.  If access to pen-raised fish is limited to 
specific groups, this may then have a detrimental impact on those who are 
more dependent on collective fishing events targeting non-stocked fish.  
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Appendix A. Map of Komio Village Territory and Korondaga fishing 
territory 
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Appendix B. List of Semi-structured Interviews 
 
Interview 
#  Date  Location  Name 
# of 
Respondents 
1  Sept.27  Komio  Village chief and his advisors  7 
2  "  Komio  Senior Bozo fisher  4 
3  Sept.28  Komio  Komio "Prime minister"  1 
4  "  Kamaka  Village chief and his advisors  5 
5  "  Ninya-daga  Senior camp resident  5 
6  Sept.29  Komio  Somono water master  1 
7  "  Komio  Women's group leadership  7 
8  "  Kouana  Village chief and his advisor  2 
         Total respondents =  32 
 
 